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ABSTRACT 
WHY DOES DRINKING ALCOHOL AFFECT RISK-SEEKING BEHAVIOR? 
A TEST OF THE NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE HYPOTHESIS 
John D. Dimoff, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014 
 
Research suggests that the drinking environment can affect dynamic processes involved in group 
decision making. The current study evaluated the need for cognitive closure (NFCC) as a 
mechanism underlying previously observed effects of alcohol dosage-set (i.e., beliefs persons have 
about the content of their beverages) on risk-seeking behavior. Five-hundred-four social drinkers 
(261 female) were assembled into 168 three-person groups and randomly assigned to one of three 
beverage conditions: alcohol, placebo, and no-alcohol control. Following beverage consumption, 
groups were asked to choose between two options of equal expected value, one of which offered 
a greater yet less certain (i.e., “riskier”) outcome. Groups were given 150-sec to make a decision 
and were required to reach consensus. Group discussion was video-recorded, and behavioral 
measures of NFCC were systematically coded by three independent raters. Results did not support 
NFCC as a mechanism explaining the earlier finding; however, results suggested that the decision 
making task used here may not have offered a sensitive test of NFCC. Though methodological 
limitations were detected, supplemental analyses indicate that dosage-set affected group decision 
making prior to observable deliberation, and that groups valued affiliation more than they valued 
specific decision making outcomes regardless of which beverage was consumed or which decision 
was initially endorsed. These findings raise new questions regarding the effects of implicit 
cognitions and normative influence on decisions made in drinking contexts.
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1.0   INTRODUCTION 
Drinking is an important social experience in cultures across the world. While drinking is 
associated with many positive social encounters, rituals, and celebrations, so too is it linked to a 
range of risky decisions and hazardous outcomes. Recent epidemiologic data suggest that in 2010 
alone, 1.9 million U.S. hospital discharges had an alcohol-related diagnosis (Chen & Yi, 2012) 
and 112 million U.S. adults reported episodes of alcohol-impaired driving (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2011). The current study aimed to build upon these findings, examining 
the possibility that the drinking experience—defined here as both alcohol consumption as well as 
merely the belief that one has been drinking alcohol—affects dynamic processes involved in group 
decision making. Specifically, this study evaluated the role that the need for cognitive closure plays 
in explaining the association between drinking and group decision making. In doing so, the current 
study aimed to enhance our understanding of the effects of drinking on cognitive and motivational 
factors that may account in part for decision making deficits. 
1.1 EFFECTS OF DRINKING ON DECISION MAKING: EARLY WORK 
Most experimental researchers have emphasized the pharmacologic effects of alcohol 
consumption on decision making, suggesting that ethanol’s effects on the central nervous system 
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alter decision making processes in relatively direct ways. Though many studies have tested for 
such effects, their findings have been surprisingly inconsistent. That is, some have observed 
pharmacologic effects of alcohol consumption on decision making (e.g., Marinkovic, 
Rickenbacher, Azma, & Artsy, 2012; Miller & Fillmore, 2013), while others have failed to do so 
(e.g., Peacock, Bruno, Martin, & Carr, 2013; Caswell, Morgan, & Duka, 2013). In attempting to 
understand these inconsistencies, one must consider that most alcohol administration studies have 
tested participants in isolation. This individualized approach is limited given that the majority of 
“real world” drinking occurs in a social context (Bachman, Johnston, O’Malley, & Bare, 1985). 
Moreover, as demonstrated by research on conformity (Asch, 1956), obedience (Milgram, 1963), 
bystander intervention (Darley, & Latané, 1968), risky shift (Stoner, 1968), and groupthink (Janis, 
1972), the social context itself has a major influence on decision making. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that research could assess the totality of drinking’s effects on decision making when participants 
drink in isolation. 
 A small number of alcohol administration studies have tested decision making in a 
social context, with mixed results. For example, Sayette, Kirchner, Moreland, Levine, and Travis 
(2004) found that groups were more likely to propose a risky decision after consuming alcohol 
than after consuming a placebo (i.e., a nonalcoholic beverage designed to appear to participants as 
if it contains alcohol), whereas Abrams, Hopthrow, Hulbert, and Frings (2006) found no effect of 
alcohol on risk attraction among groups. One should interpret these findings with caution, though, 
given that both studies used small samples (i.e., 9-12 groups per drink condition) and neither 
included a no-alcohol control condition (i.e., groups consumed only alcohol or placebo beverages). 
By informing all participants that they would consume alcohol, these two studies could not 
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manipulate dosage-set (i.e., “beliefs persons have about the alcoholic content of beverages they 
have consumed”; Martin & Sayette, 1993, p. 759), discussed further in the following section. 
1.2 PHARMACOLOGIC AND DOSAGE-SET EFFECTS OF DRINKING 
For decades, anthropologists have demonstrated that non-pharmacologic factors can affect the 
ways in which groups behave while drinking. In their classic volume, “Drunken Comportment,” 
MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) describe the effects of drinking across many different societies. 
Their conclusion is that alcohol has extremely variable effects on behavior (e.g., disinhibited 
behavior), and how one reacts while drinking largely depends on the beliefs that a society holds 
about how one should act while intoxicated. These authors highlight the power of context in 
shaping drinking’s effects across cultures and situations, which argues against the common belief 
that ingestion of alcohol inevitably reduces one to a “mere creature of impulse” (1969, p. 36). This 
notion is echoed by Fromme and D’Amico, who note in their review of the neurobiological 
consequences of drinking that “many complex social and behavioral aspects of alcohol use cannot 
be readily explained by neurochemical actions” (1999, p. 444).  
Despite the importance of one’s attitudes and beliefs about drinking, many experimental 
researchers have emphasized the pharmacologic aspects of drinking (see Sher, 1987; Steele & 
Josephs, 1990). This pharmacologic bias can be justified to some extent, as many studies find 
similar effects between placebo and control conditions, suggesting a weak effect of dosage-set 
(e.g., Bradlyn, Strickler, & Maxwell, 1981; Sutker, Allain, Brantley, & Randall, 1982). Inspection 
of this literature suggests, however, that in many instances the placebo condition has been executed 
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poorly, likely failing to instill the belief that one has been consuming alcohol. Stated differently, 
the placebo condition often has functioned more like a no-alcohol control condition in which 
participants are truthfully informed that they are drinking a nonalcoholic beverage, than a 
condition that aims to deceive participants that they have been consuming alcohol. Consistent with 
this concern, reviewers have identified particular methods needed to successfully implement a 
viable placebo beverage; these include (1) mixing beverages in the presence of participants, (2) 
providing false BAC feedback, and (3) creating a stimulating social environment, which shifts 
participants’ focus away from physiological cues (see Hull & Bond, 1986; Marlatt & Rohsenow, 
1980; Rohsenow & Marlatt, 1981). When these conditions are satisfied, placebo conditions are 
more likely to induce an alcohol dosage-set and less likely to function as de facto control 
conditions. The current study derives from a parent study that aimed to employ these enhanced 
placebo beverage procedures in order to provide a sensitive test of both the pharmacologic and 
dosage-set effects of drinking on group decision making processes.  
While methodological limitations associated with placebo manipulations may have led to 
difficulties teasing apart pharmacologic and non-pharmacologic effects of drinking, there has been 
some laboratory evidence that converges with the anthropological observations noted by 
MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) to support effects of dosage-set on “drunken” behavior. For 
example, data comparing the sexual response of men consuming a placebo and a no-alcohol control 
beverage find dramatic effects of dosage-set. Male social drinkers listened to recorded descriptions 
of heterosexual intercourse, forcible rape, and nonsexual sadistic aggression. Placebo participants, 
who were falsely informed that they had consumed alcohol, experienced greater levels of 
physiological sexual arousal than did participants in the no-alcohol control condition, who were 
correctly instructed that they had received a non-alcohol control beverage. In contrast to those who 
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thought they were not consuming alcohol, participants who believed they were consuming alcohol 
were as aroused by the account of forcible rape as by the account of heterosexual intercourse 
(Briddell, Rimm, Caddy, Krawitz, Sholis, & Wunderlin, 1978). 
Pertinent to the current study, Hull and Bond (1986) conclude in their meta-analysis of 
placebo effects that social behaviors are especially affected by dosage-set, with actual consumption 
of alcohol having “nonsignificant effects on social behaviors.” (p. 350). They argue that the effects 
of dosage-set may be explained by an attributional mechanism first proposed by Marlatt and 
Rohsenow (1980). Specifically, consuming a placebo may provide an excuse to “engage in what 
would otherwise be considered inappropriate acts” (Hull & Bond, 1986, p. 347).  
In their recent review of dosage-set effects, Moss and Albery (2009) suggest that the 
drinking environment can prime people with mental representations of behaviors associated with 
drinking (e.g., increased sociability; Sheeran, Aarts, Custers, Rivis, Webb, & Cooke, 2005), which 
can make certain responses more accessible than they otherwise would be. For example, people 
who believe that drinking gives them “Dutch courage” may be primed to perform risky behaviors 
even before experiencing the pharmacologic effects of ethanol. Our research team (Sayette, 
Dimoff, Levine, Moreland, & Votruba-Drzal, 2012b) recently explored this idea, using a three 
drink condition design (alcohol, placebo, and a no-alcohol control) to test the impact of alcohol 
consumption and dosage-set on decision making in groups. We observed that, relative to no-
alcohol control groups, alcohol and placebo groups were more likely to make a risky decision—
that is, to toss a coin to determine the amount of time in which they would complete a series of 
questionnaires—compared to a safe (no coin toss) decision in which the amount of time was fixed. 
The mechanisms underlying this effect of drinking on decision making, however, remain unclear 
and were the focus of the current study. The following section explores a theory of decision making 
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that may improve our understanding of how risky decisions are affected by drinking and dosage-
set. 
1.3 NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE 
Various decision making theories have bid to explain the mechanisms underlying decision making. 
Some theories target one’s cognitive processes (Evans, 2006), or both cognitive and motivational 
processes (Kunda, 1990). More germane to social decision making, other researchers have focused 
on social processes such as normative influence (see Asch, 1956; Latané, 1981) and group 
polarization (Isenberg, 1986). One theory that has distinguished itself by focusing on cognitive 
and motivational factors in both individual and social settings, and which may be especially well 
suited to illuminate the impact of alcohol on group decision making, is the need for cognitive 
closure (NFCC). 
NFCC refers to “individuals’ desire for a firm answer to a question, any firm answer as 
compared to confusion and/or ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 2004, p. 6). This desire to resolve 
uncertainty as quickly as possible motivates people to seek closure with urgency (“seize” upon a 
solution) and maintain the permanence of such closure (“freeze” on that solution). At moderate 
levels, NFCC aids people in efficiently evaluating information, drawing conclusions, and retaining 
knowledge—processes essential for everyday functioning (Kruglanski, 1989). At high levels, 
however, NFCC may increase the likelihood of problematic behaviors (e.g., making hasty 
decisions, safeguarding prejudiced beliefs). 
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Researchers have measured NFCC in myriad ways. In group decision making studies, it 
has been measured most often in terms of decision making latency (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987; 
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996) and member participation 
(De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999; Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, & Kruglanski, 
2003; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). Specifically, high NFCC tends to reduce 
(1) the time taken to initiate task-oriented discussion, (2) the time taken to discontinue task-
oriented discussion (a proxy for consensus) (3) the number of speaking turns taken by group 
members, and (4) the equality of speech distribution across group members. (Note that these four 
measures were used in the current research.) This suggests that when NFCC is high, groups tend 
to orient quickly to tasks, rush to consensus, share minimal information, and favor hierarchical (as 
opposed to egalitarian) structure 
NFCC can be influenced by situational manipulations, which subsequently can affect group 
phenomena. For instance, studies have stimulated a group’s NFCC by increasing ambient noise 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1991) and inducing mental fatigue (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 
1996). Most often, however, researchers have used time pressure to enhance NFCC using groups 
of three or four people (see Isenberg, 1981; De Grada et al., 1999; Pierro et al., 2003; Chirumbolo, 
Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004). Time pressure appears to increase NFCC by making 
groups feel as though they are in danger of missing an important deadline, which leads to an acute 
increase in the motivation to achieve closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Such pressure is 
particularly salient when groups are required to reach consensus, given that this requirement 
encourages deliberate exchanges of information (Nijstad & Oltmanns, 2012). The current study 
aimed to include many of these features to provide a test of the impact of alcohol and dosage-set 
on NFCC in a group decision making task. 
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1.4 NFCC, DRINKING, AND DECISION MAKING 
Webster (1993) examined decision making in three-person groups across three beverage 
conditions (moderate alcohol, low alcohol, placebo). Relative to low alcohol and placebo groups, 
moderate alcohol groups reported a greater desire to reach agreement quickly and shared fewer 
pieces of information while deliberating. The idea that the drinking experience would increase 
NFCC is bolstered by other research indicating that dosage-set can quicken the perception of time 
(Lapp, Collins, Zywiak, & Izzo, 1994). This latter finding raises the possibility that drinking may 
exacerbate and make especially salient any existing time pressure, and thereby heighten NFCC, 
especially when groups must reach a consensus under this time pressure.  
Taken together, the data reported by Webster (1993) and by Lapp and colleagues (1994) 
suggest an association between drinking and NFCC, and raise questions for further research. For 
example, what is the role of dosage-set? While the study by Lapp et al. (1994) suggests that time 
urgency may be intensified primarily by an alcohol dosage-set (rather than the pharmacologic 
effects of alcohol), Webster’s experiment did not feature a no-alcohol control condition. Moreover, 
Webster’s placebo condition may have been suboptimal for leading participants to believe that 
they had consumed an alcoholic beverage, as she reported using only one of the recommended 
dosage-set techniques (smearing vodka on the rims of participants’ glasses). As detailed earlier, 
mixing beverages in the presence of participants and providing false BAC feedback can enhance 
the effectiveness of the placebo deception, above and beyond the effect of singular manipulations. 
In addition, Webster does not report any manipulation check data; therefore, it is unclear how 
successfully participants in her placebo condition were deceived. Accordingly, Webster’s study 
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suggests that alcohol’s effects on decision making may be mediated by NFCC, but leaves open 
whether this effect on NFCC may be based on pharmacologic or dosage-set effects of alcohol. 
It also should be noted that Webster’s decision making task—determining which of three 
student government candidates was most qualified for office—was hypothetical and free of 
consequences. This may be important, as in many cases hypothetical responding corresponds 
weakly to actual behavior (see Krasnor, 1983). Therefore, it remains to be seen how drinking 
would affect groups making what they perceived to be a non-hypothetical decision of consequence. 
Finally, while Webster’s study was able to detect a main effect of alcohol consumption, it was 
insufficiently powered to conduct mediation analyses. As a result, it was unable to test whether 
high NFCC mediated the relation between alcohol consumption and poor decision making. We 
recently expanded upon a number of these procedures, and are in position to investigate the 
questions raised by Webster’s interesting study. 
1.5 EFFECTS OF DRINKING ON DECISION MAKING: RECENT WORK 
As noted earlier, we observed an effect of dosage-set on risky decision making in three-person 
groups (Sayette et al., 2012b). This initial study left open consideration of potential mechanisms 
underlying this association. In addition, it offered a unique opportunity to evaluate the link between 
drinking and group decision making using NFCC, a novel measure underutilized in the alcohol 
literature. 
Consistent with previous studies of NFCC, we placed groups under high time pressure 
(150-sec, a time interval that is consistent with the highest pressures found in the NFCC literature; 
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e.g., Kruglanski, Peri, & Zakai, 1991). Our study also required groups to reach a consensus, which, 
as noted earlier, increases NFCC. In contrast to the study by Webster, we included beverage 
conditions designed to tease apart pharmacologic and dosage-set effects of alcohol. Specifically, 
we used (1) a no-alcohol control condition, (2) a placebo condition featuring multiple dosage-set 
manipulations (including false BAC feedback presented immediately before the decision making 
task), and (3) a moderate alcohol dose condition1. In addition, while our decision making task was 
less complex than the one used by Webster, it nonetheless had perceived actual (i.e., non-
hypothetical) consequences and used a sample large enough to conduct mediation analyses. 
Importantly, the 150-sec discussions during which groups decided whether or not to toss the coin 
were videotaped, which allowed us to evaluate the potential role of NFCC in understanding the 
association between drinking and decision making. In the current study these videos were coded 
to examine the effects of alcohol and dosage-set on NFCC. 
1.6 HYPOTHESES 
We observed that, relative to groups consuming a no-alcohol control beverage, groups believing 
that they had consumed alcohol were more likely to choose a riskier option during a time-limited 
discussion (Sayette et al., 2012b). In the current study, I aimed to elaborate on this initial finding 
                                                 
1 While some researchers (e.g., Marlatt, Demming, & Reid, 1973) have included a fourth, “antiplacebo” condition in 
which participants receive an unexpected dose of alcohol, research has accumulated suggesting that this condition 
cannot be executed reliably (see Martin & Sayette, 1993).  Importantly, the remaining three groups still permit tests 
of the main effects of pharmacology and dosage–set (Martin & Sayette, 1993). 
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by testing the role of NFCC as a mediator of the impact of drinking on group decision making. 
Specifically I aimed to test the following hypotheses. 
1.6.1 H1: There will be a main effect of dosage-set on NFCC 
There is considerable research suggesting that the effect of drinking on decision making is 
pharmacologically driven. However, based on our prior coin toss findings (Sayette et al., 2012b) 
and the work of others detailed earlier in this proposal (e.g., Hull & Bond, 1986; Lapp et al., 1994), 
I predicted that alcohol and placebo groups would similarly demonstrate higher NFCC, relative to 
control groups. They would do so by demonstrating (a) reduced decision making latency and (b) 
restricted participation of members. 
 
1.6.2 H2: NFCC will mediate the association of dosage-set and risk-seeking 
As noted earlier, preliminary analysis of these data revealed an effect of dosage-set on risk-seeking 
behavior. I predicted that NFCC would mediate this effect, such that (a) alcohol and placebo 
groups (who had an alcohol dosage-set) would demonstrate higher NFCC as defined earlier, 
relative to control groups (who had a no-alcohol dosage-set), and that (b) high NFCC would be 
positively associated with risk-seeking behavior, defined as choosing the less certain of two 
options in a decision making (coin toss) task. These predictions were based on the notion that 
alcohol dosage-set may increase perceived time pressure, which may promote subsequent risk-
seeking by pressuring groups into making heuristic judgments shaped by salient cues (e.g., 
impulsive cognitions may be particularly accessible in drinking environments). Stated in terms of 
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Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation model, I predicted that alcohol dosage-set (X) would increase 
NFCC (M) (Path a); NFCC (M) would promote risk-seeking behavior (Y) (Path b); and the 
previously observed effect of dosage-set (X) on risk-seeking behavior (Y) (Path c’) would no longer 
be significant when Paths a and b were controlled. 
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2.0  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
The current study included 504 participants from the parent study conducted by Sayette et al. 
(2012b). These participants engaged in the coin toss discussion in three-person groups2 and video 
of their discussion was digitally recorded3. Participants (261 female) were between the ages of 21 
and 28, recruited from community newspapers, and screened using telephone and laboratory 
interviews. All eligible participants reported social drinking practices (e.g., drinking an average of 
at least four drinks per month); no eligible participants reported dependence on substances other 
than nicotine or caffeine, or medical conditions that ethically contraindicated alcohol use. 
2.2 PROCEDURES 
2.2.1 Predrink Assessment 
After successful completion of screening procedures, eligible participants were invited to an 
experimental session. Prior to the experimental session, participants were asked to abstain from 
                                                 
2 An additional 180 participants completed the coin toss task in isolation (i.e., not in three-person groups). These 
participants were excluded from the current study given its focus on group decision making. 
3 While a total of 540 participants made their decisions in groups, the first 10 group discussions were not recorded 
and two others were lost due to technical problems. Therefore, an additional 36 participants were excluded. 
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alcohol and drugs for 24-hr, caffeine for 4-hr, and nicotine for 1-hr prior to arrival. Participants 
were told that abstinence would be confirmed using breath instruments. Participants also were told 
that they could not drive to or from the experimental session, and that they would be provided with 
bus passes if needed. Upon arrival, all participants provided a breath sample. Participants in the 
placebo condition were asked to use mouthwash before providing their sample, as doing so 
minimizes taste cues (Rohsenow & Marlatt, 1981). Participants who registered a positive blood 
alcohol content (BAC) were rescheduled; participants who registered a negative BAC then ate a 
weight-adjusted amount of food (bagel) to standardize the rate of alcohol absorption across 
participants. 
2.2.2 Drink administration 
Participants were randomly assigned to groups of three unacquainted persons. Each group in turn 
was randomly assigned to drink a beverage containing a moderate dose of alcohol (alcohol 
condition; group n = 57), a placebo (placebo condition; group n = 57), or no alcohol (control 
condition; group n = 54). Alcohol participants were given a beverage that was 1 part 100-proof 
vodka (males: 0.82 g/kg; females: 0.74 g/kg) and 3.5 parts cranberry juice cocktail; placebo 
participants were given a beverage that was 1 part flattened tonic water, poured from a vodka 
bottle, and 3.5 parts cranberry juice cocktail. Control participants were told that they would not 
receive alcohol and were given cranberry juice cocktail in equal volume. To enhance credibility in 
the placebo condition, drinks were mixed in front of all participants, and the glasses of placebo 
participants were smeared in vodka (Rohsenow & Marlatt, 1981; Schlauch, Waesche, Riccardi, 
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Donohue, Blagg, Christensen, et al., 2010). Each group drank together over a 36-min interval while 
sitting around a circular table in the experimental room. 
2.2.3 Postdrink assessment 
Following beverage consumption, participants’ BAC levels were measured individually. To help 
control for dosage-set, placebo participants were randomly assigned a BAC reading ranging from 
.041% to .043%, which is about the highest credible level one can use (see Martin & Sayette, 
1993). Following BAC assessment, participants returned to the experimental room, reforming their 
original groups. At this point, groups learned that they soon would complete tasks related to 
memory and cognitive performance, after which they would remain in the laboratory for a few 
more hours. Alcohol and placebo participants were told that they would remain in order to allow 
their BACs to drop; control participants were told that they would remain in order to standardize 
the amount of time participants had between tasks. 
2.2.4 Decision making (coin toss) task 
Following postdrink assessment, participants were asked to complete additional questionnaires 
while in the laboratory, which the experimenter was considering for use in a future study. However, 
participants were given two options: (1) they could decide as a group to complete about 30-min 
worth of questionnaires and spend the remaining time reading or relaxing; (2) alternatively, they 
could choose to toss a coin and, pending the outcome, either complete no questionnaires or about 
60-min worth of them. In this paradigm, choosing to toss the coin is considered a riskier decision 
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than choosing not to toss given that the decisions share an expected value (i.e., a 50% chance of 
60-min = a 100% chance of 30-min), yet the former offers a less certain outcome (see also 
Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). They then were informed that they 
would have 150-sec to make their decision, and that all group members must choose the same 
option (i.e., the group would need to reach consensus within the context of time pressure). 
The experimenter subsequently left the room for 150-sec, during which the participants 
were digitally recorded while they made their decision. Separate wall-mounted cameras faced each 
participant, and a common microphone was located at the center of the table. (Participants had 
been told that the cameras would be used to monitor their rate of consumption during drink 
administration.) After 150-sec had elapsed, the experimenter returned to the room and asked for 
the group’s decision. Decisions were documented by the experimenter at that time, and later 
verified from video by a rater blind to condition. After making their decision, participants 
completed additional tasks and self-report measures, which are not reported here.4 At the end of 
the study, participants were debriefed, paid $60, and allowed to leave.  
                                                 
4 The parent research project collected self-report measures of personality, alcohol expectancies, sensation seeking, 
self-consciousness, and other individual differences. The complete list of measures is available upon request. 
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2.3 DEPENDENT MEASURES 
2.3.1 Decision making latency 
Decision making latency was operationalized as time to initiation and time to discontinuation of 
discussion related to the coin toss task. Time to initiation reflected the urgency with which groups 
sought closure (groups are unlikely to delay task-oriented discussion when NFCC is high); time to 
discontinuation reflected the tendency of groups to “close” task-oriented discussion once a definite 
answer was proposed (groups are unlikely to elaborate on or to challenge early ideas when NFCC 
is high). These measures required the coding of proposals, which were defined as declarations that 
a group member either did or did not want to toss the coin. To aid in the coding of proposals, 
discussions during the coin toss task were transcribed. Transcripts were used by three independent 
raters to code for first, second, and final proposals. Interrater agreement was good (≈ 77%); when 
one rater disagreed, the proposal which had been agreed upon by the two other raters was counted. 
To measure time to initiation, I calculated the number of seconds preceding first proposals; to 
measure time to discontinuation, I calculated the number of seconds between first and final 
proposals. 
2.3.2 Member participation 
Member participation was operationalized as the number of speaking turns taken by the group and 
the equality of speech distribution across group members. Three independent raters coded speech 
behavior according to Dabbs and Ruback’s (1987) Grouptalk model. [Reliability coding for a 
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random subset of 87 participants revealed good levels of interrater agreement (κ = .82).] Within 
this model, an individual speaking turn consisted of one participant’s vocalizations and pauses that 
led to further vocalizations. By using the Grouptalk model, I could measure each group member’s 
speaking turns and speech duration. Given my focus on group-level processes, I then summed 
group members’ speaking turns to calculate one total number of turns for each group, and used 
individual-level measures of speech duration to calculate a group-level intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC). High ICCs indicated equitable speech distribution; low ICCs indicated 
inequitable distribution. 
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3.0  RESULTS 
Four groups were excluded from analysis due to missing or corrupted video files. Therefore, the 
final sample consisted of 164 three-person groups randomly assigned to one of three beverage 
conditions: alcohol (n = 57), placebo (n = 56), and no-alcohol control (n = 51). 
3.1 BASELINE MEASURES 
Eighty-three percent of participants identified themselves as Caucasian, 10% as African American, 
2% as Asian, 1% as Hispanic, and 3% as other. Age, marital status, income, smoking status, and 
race/ethnicity were equivalent across beverage conditions, as were responses to questions about 
drinking history and current drinking patterns. Participants reported drinking on average a bit more 
than twice a week [M = 3.7 (SD = 0.9) using a 7-point scale with “3” = 1-2 occasions/week and 
“4” = 2-3 occasions/week] and consuming an average of 4.3 (SD = 1.9) drinks per occasion. All 
participants reported that they could comfortably drink at least 3 drinks in 30-40 min. 
3.2 MANIPULATION CHECK 
Participants who consumed alcohol were on the ascending limb of the BAC curve with a mean 
BAC of .054 (SD = .012) at the time of the coin toss task. As shown in Table 1, all beverage 
manipulation measures revealed greater effects for alcohol than for placebo and control 
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participants (ps < .001). On a measure of subjective intoxication preceding the coin toss task, 
alcohol participants reported higher levels of intoxication [M = 38.2 (SD = 17.1)] than did placebo 
participants [M = 14.0 (SD = 10.1)], who in turn reported higher levels of intoxication that did 
control participants [M = 0.1 (SD = 0.7)]. On a post-experimental questionnaire, all alcohol and 
placebo participants reported drinking at least 1 oz. of vodka. Alcohol participants estimated 
drinking more vodka [M = 7.1 oz. (SD = 10.4)] and reported a higher peak intoxication level [M = 
43.5 (SD = 18.7) on a scale from 0 (not at all intoxicated) to 100 (the most intoxicated you have 
ever felt)] than did placebo participants, who in turn estimated drinking more vodka (M = 4.9 oz. 
(SD = 6.3)] and reported a higher peak intoxication level [M = 14.98 (SD = 10.6)] than did control 
participants [vodka estimate M = 0.4 oz. (SD = 3.3); peak intoxication M = 0.6 (SD = 3.4)]. Results 
indicate that, consistent with our prior studies (e.g., Sayette et al., 2004; Sayette, Martin, Perrott, 
Wertz, & Hufford, 2001), placebo participants reported experiencing some level of intoxication. 
That is, they felt significantly more intoxicated than control participants and significantly less 
intoxicated than participants consuming alcohol. 
3.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESES 
Before testing my hypotheses, I analyzed all four dependent measures using Shapiro-Wilk tests of 
normality (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). Analysis revealed that all measures were positively skewed (ps 
< .001). Square root transformations failed to reduce skew; therefore, logarithmic transformations 
were used for all regression analyses. (Note that transformations did not affect the key findings 
reported below.) 
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As noted earlier, I predicted that (1) there would be a main effect of dosage-set on NFCC 
and (2) NFCC would mediate the association of dosage-set and risk-seeking. Implicit in these 
predictions was that alcohol and placebo groups, each of whom had an alcohol dosage-set, would 
have similar findings. If similarities were found, alcohol and placebo groups would be combined 
into one alcohol dosage-set group; if similarities were not found, each group would be analyzed 
separately. Therefore, prior to testing my first hypothesis, I examined raw means (i.e., means 
calculated using non-transformed data, which appear in Table 2) and used multiple regression 
analyses to assess whether beverage condition affected time to initiation, time to discontinuation, 
number of speaking turns, and equality of speech distribution. More specifically, dichotomous 
indicators of beverage condition, with the no-alcohol control condition as the reference group, 
were used to predict each of the four dependent measures individually, though the same overall 
model structure was used in each analysis. These analyses did not demonstrate consistent 
similarities between alcohol and placebo groups; therefore, each group was analyzed separately. 
As illustrated in Table 3, the three beverage conditions did not differ in time to initiation 
or in time to discontinuation. [Raw means suggested that alcohol-consuming groups took more 
time to discontinue (M = 41.9 sec), relative to non-alcohol-consuming groups (placebo M = 27.9 
sec; control M = 29.8 sec). Though this difference did not reach standard levels of significance (p 
= .11), there nonetheless was a small effect of alcohol consumption on time to discontinuation (d 
= .27; Cohen, 1992).] Dosage-set appears to have influenced number of speaking turns, although 
not in the predicted direction (i.e., control groups took fewer turns relative to alcohol and placebo 
groups). To assess equality of speech distribution, ICCs were calculated for each beverage 
condition and then compared using Fisher transformations (Fisher, 1915). Comparisons revealed 
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that neither alcohol (z = 1.54, p = .12) nor placebo (z = 1.14, p = .25) groups differed from control 
groups with regards to equality of speech distribution. 
3.4 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
Given that my first hypothesis was not supported (i.e., dosage-set did not enhance NFCC), 
mediation analysis was discontinued as recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). However, in 
an effort to better understand the findings, I conducted a series of supplemental analyses. These 
analyses examined the following questions: (1) to what extent did our coin toss task satisfy the 
assumptions of NFCC and (2) why, though only a trend (p = .11), did alcohol-consuming groups 
demonstrate greater time to discontinuation relative to non-alcohol-consuming groups? 
3.4.1 Methodological assumptions for testing NFCC 
In order to best interpret these null findings, I first re-examined the extent to which our experiment 
provided a fair test of NFCC. As noted earlier, our coin toss task appeared to satisfy many 
assumptions needed to test NFCC. For example, we placed groups under time pressure and forced 
them to reach consensus in a task perceived to have real consequences. Presumably, group 
discussions in which the second proposal generated was in opposition to the first would lead to 
lengthier debates than when the first two proposals were for the same option. Consistent with this 
assumption, agreement between first and second proposals was negatively correlated with time to 
discontinuation (r = -.43, p < .001). Unfortunately, agreement between first and second proposals 
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was found in 87.20% of groups, and 90.24% of groups ultimately chose the option proposed first. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that nearly all groups reached consensus well before the 
150-sec time limit was reached. In fact, 90.24% of groups completed the task in less than 120-sec 
(i.e., time to initiation + time to discontinuation < 120-sec). Thus, despite our best intentions, 
participants may have failed to experience time pressure to reach a decision regarding the coin 
toss.  
Another key assumption was that the perceived actual consequences in our task 
(completing 0-, 30-, or 60-min of additional questionnaires) would create a significant enough 
consequence that the outcome would matter to participants. Post-hoc analyses suggested, however, 
that participants may not have cared very much about whether the risky or cautious option was 
selected. While both options were initially proposed with reasonable frequency (36% choosing the 
riskier option), the particular direction of the initial proposal had no impact on the likelihood that 
the second person would agree. (In other words, consensus was reached in similar times regardless 
of decision making outcome.) In addition, agreement between first and second proposals was not 
affected by beverage condition. Therefore, while groups made both risky and cautious decisions, 
their decisions do not appear to be the result of extensive debate. Rather, it seemed like the group’s 
desire to agree may have overridden any individual’s desire to have one option or the other prevail. 
In this sense it may be that NFCC was high in all beverage conditions; however, it also may be 
that groups used agreement as a way to satisfy other motives, such as the need to belong. Thus 
while we aimed to create a real consequence that would add to the pressure to reach a preferred 
outcome, it appears that the consequences of the task were perceived to be of such low stakes that 
agreeing with the initial proposal (regardless of which one it was) proved to be more important to 
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participants than reaching a particular resolution. Given these findings, it is unclear that our coin 
toss task did create ideal conditions for testing NFCC. 
3.4.2 Effects of alcohol consumption on time to discontinuation 
As noted earlier, alcohol-consuming groups demonstrated greater time to discontinuation relative 
to non-alcohol-consuming groups. Though this finding did not reach standard levels of 
significance (p = .11), it nonetheless reflected a small effect. For the purpose of exploring in a post 
hoc fashion any unexpected effects, these data suggest an effect of alcohol on decision making 
latency in the opposite direction to what Webster (1993) found. To better understand this potential 
finding, I first tested whether alcohol groups experienced lower agreement between first and 
second proposals, relative to non-alcohol groups. This analysis revealed no difference (p = .88), 
suggesting that the pharmacologic effects of alcohol consumption did not affect agreement 
between first and second proposals. Additional analyses were conducted to determine if this small 
alcohol effect was driven by a greater number of long utterances. I therefore examined the 
frequency of long utterances (i.e., utterances > 20 words) and task orientation of long utterances 
(i.e., related or unrelated to the coin toss), neither of which differed between alcohol and non-
alcohol groups (p = .19; p = .49).  
Finally, I tested the association of time to discontinuation and time spent talking during the 
36-min group drink administration interaction (occurring just prior to the coin toss task), given 
that alcohol-consuming groups spoke longer during the drinking phase compared to non-alcohol-
consuming groups (see Sayette, Creswell, Dimoff, Fairbairn, Cohn, Heckman et al., 2012a). These 
measures were not associated (r = .04, p = .63); therefore, it does not appear as though the 
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additional time required to make a decision when consuming alcohol was due simply to being 
more talkative during the social bonding portion of the study. In sum, to the degree that alcohol 
extended the time required to make a decision, it appears as though it did so by slightly extending 
the mean length of utterances without increasing the actual number of utterances [alcohol M = 
5.25 sec/utterance (SD = 7.01); non-alcohol M = 3.04 sec/utterance (SD = 3.22); p = .42]. 
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
The current study was inspired by our observation that groups that believed they had consumed 
alcohol were less cautious during a coin toss task than were groups that did not hold this belief. I 
aimed to enhance understanding of this earlier finding, and in light of work by Webster (1993) and 
by Lapp et al. (1994), I evaluated NFCC as a novel mechanism that might explain the association 
of dosage-set and group decision making. Specifically, I predicted that there would be a main 
effect of dosage-set on NFCC, and that NFCC would mediate the association of dosage-set and 
risky decision making. The current study appeared to offer a fair test of NFCC, given that the coin 
toss task was thought to feature high time pressure, forced consensus, and perceived real 
consequences. In addition, given its large sample size, this study had robust power to test the 
proposed main effect of dosage-set (of a medium-sized effect) on NFCC. Results did not, however, 
indicate a dosage-set effect on NFCC. To the contrary, though the differences in number of 
speaking turns and equality of speech distribution did not reach significance, they nevertheless 
were in the opposite direction of what would be predicted by NFCC. Results did suggest that 
dosage-set affects the initial proposed selection, rather than the ensuing discussions, and that actual 
alcohol consumption (as opposed to dosage-set) may have extended decision making latency. 
Although the NFCC hypothesis was not supported, review of the data suggests that our assessment 
of NFCC may have been hampered by certain methodological limitations.  
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4.1 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
Despite sharing similarities with classic tests of NFCC, the coin toss task did not induce NFCC as 
hoped. In fact, post-hoc analyses revealed that the features most relevant to NFCC—time pressure, 
forced consensus, and perceived real consequences—all performed below expectations. 
Specifically, more than 90% of groups completed the task well before the time deadline 
approached, 87% of groups reached immediate consensus (as measured by agreement between 
first and second proposals), and immediate consensus was observed regardless of which option 
was proposed first. Taken together, these findings suggest that (1) most groups did not experience 
optimal time pressure, (2) consensus was reached easily and quickly, and (3) most groups did not 
care enough about the task’s consequences to disagree with first proposals, regardless of which 
option was initially suggested. In other words, due to the task’s relatively low stakes and its simple 
design compared to other tests of NFCC, groups’ desire for agreement may have outweighed their 
NFCC, thus rendering the decision making interval irrelevant for most. It is interesting to note, 
though, that disagreements were positively associated with time to discontinuation. Therefore, we 
may have observed greater variation in time to discontinuation had our task had higher stakes, 
which presumably would have induced more dissent.  
Though the coin toss task may have offered a suboptimal test, I found no evidence to 
suggest that NFCC explains the effect of dosage-set on risk-seeking behavior. Rather, given that 
groups typically reached consensus quickly and without disagreement, my findings suggest that 
dosage-set affected decision making before explicit proposals were raised and discussed. It is 
notable that across the different beverage conditions the cautious solution (30-min of additional 
questionnaires) was more likely to be selected than the risky decision to toss the coin. This cautious 
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bias was especially evident for the control condition groups while the groups expecting to drink 
alcohol were more balanced in their choices. It may be that a cautious mindset is the rule in the 
official laboratory environment where one’s behavior is being monitored by experimenters.  
These findings suggesting a more cautious initial proposal among control group members 
may be explained by Stacy and Weirs’ (2010) model of implicit cognition, which suggests that 
decision making is influenced by spontaneous thoughts that are learned through experience, stored 
in memory, and activated by environmental cues. (In other words, decision making often depends 
on context more than it depends on reflective debate, especially when drinking cues are salient.) 
Importantly, many people report thinking that alcohol facilitates impulsivity and disinhibition 
(Brown, Christiansen, & Goldman, 1987; Wall, McKee, & Hinson, 2000). In addition, various 
studies have demonstrated that alcohol cognitions are particularly accessible in alcohol-related 
contexts, such as actual or simulated bars (see Reich, Goldman, & Noll, 2004; Wall, Hinson, 
McKee, & Goldstein, 2001; Wall et al., 2000). Thus, group members believing they had consumed 
alcohol may have accessed less cautious thoughts related to the coin toss task than those aware 
they were drinking a nonalcoholic beverage. To some extent this alcohol context effect may have 
attenuated the otherwise cautious response bias evident among the control groups. 
In sum, the present findings do not elucidate whether an alcohol dosage-set increases 
NFCC, and whether NFCC mediates the association of dosage-set and risk-seeking behavior. 
Rather, they suggest that NFCC may be assessed better by a more complex task of greater 
consequence. Nonetheless, the present findings do leave open the possibility that an alcohol 
dosage-set activated enough alcohol cognitions to liberate alcohol and placebo groups from the 
sterility of our control condition, though not enough to entirely overcome their conservative bias. 
That is, participants may have loosened their standards of acceptable behavior when they believed 
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they were drinking in the laboratory. Such a perspective is consistent with recent findings that 
alcohol cognitions were more strongly related to drinking behavior when participants were 
assessed in a naturalistic setting than in a laboratory setting without alcohol cues, leading these 
authors to wonder whether certain laboratory environments may be too sterile to trigger cognitions 
relevant to behavior (Houben & Wiers, 2008). 
4.2 EFFECTS OF NORMATIVE INFLUENCE 
While it does not seem as though groups experienced NFCC, it does appear as though they 
experienced normative influence (i.e., the tendency to comply with the desires of others in order 
to be accepted as opposed to rejected; see Deutsch & Gerard, 1964). As noted earlier, there was 
striking agreement between first and second proposals (≈ 90%), which was consistent across 
beverage conditions and first proposals (i.e., group members were equally likely to agree with 
cautious and “risky” proposals). This suggests that group members valued affiliation more than 
they valued a specific decision making outcome, and that first proposals had a potent effect on 
subsequent proposals. These observations are consistent with classic research suggesting that 
normative influence can lead people to agree with statements they know to be untrue (Asch, 1956) 
or to fail to intervene in emergency situations (Latané & Darley, 1970). More recently, research 
has revealed that normative influence can be induced by minor experiences such as short, casual 
dialogue (Dolinski, Nawrat, & Rudak, 2001) and fleeting exposure to a stranger without any direct 
interaction (Burger, Soroka, Gonzago, Murphy, & Somervell, 2001). In addition, Kallgren, Reno, 
and Cialdini (2000) found that people are most susceptible to normative influence when they 
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recognize that certain responses are more desirable than others. This is germane to the present 
study given that first proposals clearly established which option was more desirable for one group 
member. Therefore, those who disagreed with the first proposal could be rejected by as many as 
two people, while those who agreed would be accepted by at least one. Therefore, second proposals 
may have been influenced by affiliation-oriented goals. 
4.3 EFFECT OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION ON TIME TO DISCONTINUATION 
A small effect (that failed to reach significance at p < .05) was observed suggesting that alcohol-
consuming groups may have demonstrated greater time to discontinuation relative to non-alcohol-
consuming groups. Supplemental analyses did not suggest that this potential effect of alcohol could 
be attributed to differences in agreement between first and second proposals, frequency of long 
utterances, task orientation of long utterances, or time spent talking during the social bonding 
portion of the study.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that alcohol consumption may exert a small effect 
on the amount of time groups spend talking across various settings. To the extent that this effect 
is real (i.e., can be replicated), what might it mean? Although speculative, alcohol may have 
compromised the ability of alcohol-consuming participants to articulate their points as efficiently 
as non-alcohol-consuming participants, which has been observed in other studies of speech 
production as well. For example, Moskowitz and Roth (1971), Sobell and Sobell (1972, 1982), 
Klingholz, Penning, and Liebhardt (1988), and Hollien, Liljegren, Martin, and DeJong (2001) 
found that alcohol consumption slowed speech production, even at low levels of intoxication. 
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These findings suggest that the physiological consequences of alcohol consumption (e.g., slowed 
laryngeal functioning) can compromise the efficiency with which people speak, without 
necessarily affecting the ideas expressed by speech (Klingholz et al., 1988). 
4.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
As noted earlier, our coin toss task may not have offered the desired conditions for testing NFCC, 
due to its relatively low stakes. Therefore, future alcohol research on group decision making would 
do well to use tasks of greater complexity and consequence, each of which presumably would 
increase people’s motives to disagree and facilitate greater deliberation. (For example, how might 
alcohol affect groups given the choice to be paid a $30 bonus or to toss a coin and, pending the 
outcome, earn either no bonus or a $60 bonus instead?) In addition, our task forced groups to 
decide between one of two dichotomous options; by doing so, the current study could not examine 
such processes as group polarization, which require continuous outcome measures (see Myers & 
Lamm, 1975). Also, given that we did not assess group members’ initial preferences, we could not 
determine the extent to which members publicly supported decisions they privately opposed. 
Finally, given that laboratories may feel sterile to some participants (particularly those consuming 
no-alcohol control beverages), future research would do well to examine group decision making 
in more naturalistic settings (e.g., actual or simulated bars). 
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4.5 SUMMARY 
The current research aimed to evaluate the mechanisms underlying the effects of alcohol dosage-
set on risk-seeking behavior. In particular, I posited that NFCC would explain the previously 
observed association between believing one is consuming an alcoholic beverage and the likelihood 
of choosing the “riskier” coin toss option (Sayette et al., 2012b). Results did not support NFCC as 
the mechanism underlying this finding; however, results also suggested that the coin toss task used 
here may not have offered a sensitive test of NFCC. Therefore, it remains possible that NFCC may 
affect group decisions made under different circumstances. Though methodological limitations 
were detected, the current study nonetheless revealed a small, non-significant effect of alcohol 
consumption on decision making latency, which may reflect speech production deficits unrelated 
to decision making outcomes. Moreover, findings indicate that dosage-set affected group decision 
making prior to observable deliberation, and that groups value affiliation more than they value 
specific decision making outcomes regardless of which beverage is consumed or which decision 
is initially endorsed. These findings raise new questions regarding the effects of implicit cognitions 
and normative influence, which are important to alcohol research given that risky decisions often 
have serious real-world consequences, and even minor reductions in cautiousness due to drinking 
can have major ramifications. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
Table 1. Beverage response variables 
 
 Alcohol (n = 57) Placebo (n = 56) Control (n = 51)  
Characteristic M SD M SD M SD F 
Pre-coin task BAC .054a .012 .001b .001 .001b .001 2353.55** 
Post-coin task BAC† .062a .012 .001b .001 — — 679.18** 
Pre-coin task SIS 38.22a 17.05 13.98b 10.05 0.10c 0.72 451.60** 
Post-coin task SIS† 35.43a 17.02 8.58b 11.14 — — 297.55** 
Vodka estimate (oz.) 7.07a 10.35 4.91b 6.31 0.44c 3.3 38.71** 
Peak intoxication 43.46a 18.67 14.98b 10.61 0.64c 3.42 475.88** 
* p = < .05 
** p = < .001 
†Analyses did not include control participants, as they were not asked to provide these data. 
Notes. BAC = blood alcohol concentration. SIS = subjective intoxication scale (ranging from 0 = not 
at all intoxicated to 100 = the most intoxicated I have ever been). SIS and Highest Intoxication 
scored on scales ranging from 0 to 100. BAC and SIS were not recorded post-coin task for the 
Control group. Groups with non-overlapping superscripts differed significantly (p < .05).  
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TABLE 2 
Table 2. Non-transformed mean values of NFCC measures 
 
 Alcohol (n = 57) Placebo (n = 56) Control (n = 51) 
Characteristic M SD M SD M SD 
Time to initiation (sec.) 22.16 26.21 20.37 20.14 21.52 18.60 
Time to discontinuation (sec.) 41.94 41.72 27.91 34.91 29.82 32.95 
Number of speaking turns 23.51 17.40 22.64 16.60 17.37 13.14 
Equality of speech distribution† .67 — .63 — .47 — 
† Value reported = intraclass correlation coefficient. 
Notes. Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) revealed that all measures were 
positively skewed (ps < .001). Therefore, comparisons of non-transformed values are not reported. 
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TABLE 3 
Table 3. Effects of drink condition on NFCC 
 
 TTI TTD NST ESD 
  B SE B SE B SE Z-score 
Constant 1.197 .049 1.205 .080 1.132* .044 — 
Alcohol -.042 .067 .111 .111 .122* .061 1.54 
Placebo -.012 .067 -.079 .111 .117* .061 1.14 
R2 .003 — .019 — .030* — — 
* p = < .05 when compared to constant 
Notes. Alcohol and placebo values compared to constant. Constant = no-alcohol control condition. 
B = unstandardized regression coefficient derived from logarithmically transformed data. TTI = 
time to initiation. TTD = time to discontinuation. NST = number of speaking turns. ESD = equality 
of speech distribution. ICC = intraclass correlation coefficient. ICCs compared to constant using 
Fisher’s r-to-z transformation. 
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